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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

·FLORENCE HIRST NEWCOM.B, a retired
teacher of the Ogden City Public Schools, for
herself and all other retired Public School
Teachers similarly situated.
Plaintiff,

vs.
OGDEN CITY. PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' RETIREMENT COMMISSION, H. A.
MACFARLANE, .ALPHID HENDRICKSON,
T. 0. SMITH, VIOLA M. CLANCY, GERARD
KLOMP, LLOYD I. _ALVORD and JA1\IE:S A.
LARSON, as members of Ogden City Public
School Teachers' Retirement Commission.
Defendants.

STATEMENT
~

Plaintiff, Florence Hirst Newcomb, a resident of
Ogden, Weber County, Utah, was employed as a teacher
in the Ogden City Public Schools for more than thirtyone years. On the 15th day of June, 1938, she was a
member in good standing of the Ogden City Public
School Teachers' Retirement Association and had been
such since its inception. During all of the years in
whic.h she was employed as a teacher in Ogden City
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Public Schools, deductions were made from her salary
by the Board of Education of Ogden City, Utah, pursuant to statute and her contracts of employment, and
paid into the said Teachers' Retirement Association.
On the 15th day of June, 1938, she having taught in the
Public Schools of Ogden City, Utah, for more than
thirty-one years prior thereto, and having attained the
age of sixty (60) years, was retired as a member of
said Ogden City Public School Teachers' Retirement
Association and placed upon the retired list of the Association, and thereupon she became entitled to receive
an annual annuity of $600.00.
Upon her retirement, and up to the 30th of June,
l 946, she was paid from the Association the full sum
of $600.00 annually; and beginning with the fiscal year
of July 1, 1946, and ending June 30, 1947, she was paid
the sum of $592.00; and beginning with the fiscal year
of July 1, 1947, and ending June 30, 1948, she was paid
the sum of $540.00; and for the fiscal year beginning
July 1, 1948, up to and including the 31st day of ~lay,
1949, and prior to the filing of her petition herein, she
was paid the sum of $550.00 ; and since filing her petition she has been paid the further sum of $50.00.
The plaintiff is a widow of the age of seventy (70)
years. She is also retired by the Utah State Teachers'
Retirement Board, and receives a monthly annu.ity
therefrom in thH sum of $40.95. · Plaintiff is the owner
of her own home, which she acquired by deed from her
mother prior to her mother's death.
The Legislature of the State of Utah, on March 10,
1949, passed an Act effective May 10, 1949, entitled
2
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"'Chapter 91, La\vs of Utah 1949, being au act relating
to Public School Teachers' Retirement Associations;
providing for the termination of public school teachers'
retirement associations by election of the members; and
providing for the manner in which such sums shall be
distributed.'· That pursuant to said Act on the 24th
day of May, 1949, the members of the Ogden City Public
School Teachers' Retirement Association held what
was-denominated as an election at which the Ogden City
Public School Teachers' Retirement Association was
purportedly terminated effective the 31st day of May,
1949~

The Ogden City Public School Teachers' Retirement Association now has funds and assets in excess
of $71,000.00.
Plaintiff petitioned that this Court issue its Writ
commanding the defendants to refrain and desist from
dissolving said Association and from distributing its
funds and assets, or from petitioning the District Court
of Weber County, Utah, for an order dissolving the
Association and distributing its funds and assets pur-.
suant to said Chapter 91, Laws of Utah, 1949, and commanding the defendants to continue payments of her
annuity to the plaintiff. This Court issued an Alternative Writ and defendants have filed their answer to
plaintiff's petition. The facts not admitted by the
answer are stipulated, thus leaving issues of law to be
determined.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
STATUTE ESTABLISHING TEACHERS' RETIREMENT AS,SOCIATION, TOGETHER WITH CON-

3
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TRACT PURSUANT THERETO WITH THE OGDEN
- CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION AND PLAINTIFF'_S
COMPLIANCE THEREWITH, CONSTITUTES A
BINDING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE ASSOCIATION AND THE PLAINTIFF, GIVING HER AND
ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED A VESTED RIGH1,
TO THE ANNUITY AT WHICH SHE AND SUCH
OTHERS WERE RETIRED, WHICH VESTED
RIGHTS CANNOT BE IMP AIRED OR REDUCE11
BY AN ACT QF THE LEGISLATURE.
The Statutory provision pertaining to Public School
Teachers' Retirement Associations in cities of the first
and sec.ond class (which we shall refer to hereafter as
the ''Local Act'') are contained in Chapter 29 of Title
75 Utah Code Annotated, 1943, be~ng Sections 75-29-1
to 75-29-18 inclusive, amended as to Section 75-29-9 by
Chapter 94 Laws of Utah, 1945. Formation of such
local organizations was first author~zed by an act of
our Legislature approved March 14, 1907. Hence laws
proviaing for local retirement associations long preceded the law providing for a State wide Teachers' Retirement Association, which was first enacted in 1935
then repealed and subsequently enacted in 1937. It is
very significant that when the 1937 State Teachers' Retirement Act was adopted, it was incorporated into Chapter 29 of Title 75 and its Section numbers begin consecutively following Section 75-29-18, which is the last
section pertaining to the local Associations. Can there
be any doubt that the Act creating the Associations in
cities of the first and second class had the same purpose
as to the educational systems in such cities as the Act
creating the State wide Association had as to the State
4
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Educ.a.tional System 1 We are c.ertain there can be no
do.ubt, and therefore, the purpose of the Local Act is
the same as the purpose of the State Act which was held
in the c.ase of Driggs vs. Utah Teachers' Retirement
Board, et al, 105 Utah, 417; 142 Pac. 2d. 657, to be improving the educational system by better compensating the teachers and rewarding them for faithful and
continued service thus making the profession more attractive to qualified persons.
The purpose of the Local Act being the same a.s
the State Act, we submit that the decision of this Court
in the Driggs case is controlling and is decisive of the
case at bar. In the Driggs case the plaintiff having
complied with the provisions of the State Act (part of
the same Chapter 29 of Title 75) and having retired,
was held to have a vested right in his annuity which
could not be impaired by an Act of the Legislature
passed after his retirement. Here the plaintiff, Florence
Hirst Newcomb, having complied with the provisions of
the Local Act (part of the same Chapter 29 of Title 75)
and having retired, has a vested right in her annuity
which cannot be impaired by an Act of the Legislature
passed after her retirement.
We ask the Court to bear in mind that when plaintiff was retired as a member of the Ogden City Public
School Teachers' Retirement Association on· the 15th
day of June, 1938, she ceased to be a member of the
Association and was not a member when the Legislature
on March 10, 1949, passed Chapter 91, Laws of Utah,
''.4
1949.
·\'. ,~!. '·liifl~l
·~. ·~J

'

,r~r'!I

Before retirement and while a member of the Association, plaintiff's membership in the Association was

5
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compulsory, teachers being ex-officio members by virtue
of their employment and it being compulsory to incorporate in their contract a stipulation agreeing to and
being bound by all the rules and provisions governing
membership. This is because of Section 75-29-8 ·of the
Act, which provides, :
"Every te,a.cher employed under written_ Q«;>ntract by the Board of Educ~tion of a· City of t~e
first or. second class in which city a Teachers'
Retirement Association has theretofore been organized shall, by virtue of such employment,_ p·ecome a member of such retirement :;tssocia.tio"Q.,
and there shall be incorporated in the contract
of employment a stipulation that the teacher
agrees to and is bound by a~l the rules.' and provisions governing membership in such association."
Also, before retirement, and while a member of the
system, contributions in the form· of deductions from
plaintiff's pay to the Association were compulsory. Section 75-29-9 as it was. in effect at the time of plaintiff's
retirement provides as follows :
''The income of a public scho~l teachers' retirement association shall be from the following
sources:
(1) All teachers who are members of a teach·
ers' retirement association in cities of the first
and second class shall have deducted from each
and every payment for services one per _cent .of
the amount due, and the amount of such deduction shall he certified to and paid by the Clerk of
the board of edueation monthly to the trealSil!rer
of the association; provided, that .an ann-q.al salary
of $2,100 shall be the maximum salary on~ which
,6
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dues shall be deducted, and if any teacher shall
receiYe a salary in excess. of such sum, the deduction shall be made on $2,100 only.
(2) The board of education shall pay an
amount equal to the total amount paid to the
public school teachers' retirement association
fund by or on behalf of all teachers during each
year under the provisions of subdivision (l) of
this section. The amount so payable by the board
of education shall be paid over to the treasurer
of the association in semi-annual installments.
(3) All monies received from donations, legacies, bequests or otherwise for or on account of
said fund.
The retirement commission may increase or
decrease the rate of salary deductions and the
limitations provided in this section, if· the proposed modifications have previously been approved by the board of education, and by twothirds of the ballots cast by the members of the
retirement association, at an election, called by
the retirement commission, and held, after notice
thereof posted in each school building and at the
administrative office, at l~ast ten days peri or to
the day on which said election is held. ' '
This Section was amended by Chapter 94, Laws of Utah,
1945, as follows :
''The income of a public school teachers' retirement association shall be from the following
sources:
(1) All teachers who are members of a teachers' retirement association in cities of the first
and, second class shall have deducted from each
and every payment for services one per cent of
the amount due, and the amount of such deduction
shall be certified to and paid by the clerk of the
7
f
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board of education monthly to· ·the treasurer of
the association; provided, that an annual salary
of $2,500.00 shall be the maximum salary on
which dues shall he deducted, and if any teacher
shall reeeive a salary in excess of such sum, the
deduction shall be made ~)n $2,500.00 only.
(2) The board of education shall pay an

amount equal to the total amount paid to the
public school teachers' retirement association
fund by or on behalf of all teachers during each
year under the provisions of subdivision ( 1) of
this section; provided, however, that if the rate
of contributions of teachers has reached two per
cent of the salary, as limited by the provisions
of subdivision (1) hereof, the board of education
may appropriate to the current fund of the association such additional amount, not exceeding
two per cent of the salaries of teachers for the
year in which the appropriation is made, as may
be required to meet any deficit occuring in that
fund. The amount so payable by the board of
education shall be paid over to the treasurer of
the association in semi-annual installments.
( 3) All monies received from donations, legacies, bequests or otherwise for on account of
said fund.
The retirement commission may increase or
de~crease the rate of salary deductions and the
limitations provided in this section, if the proposed modifications have previously · been approved by the board of education, and by twothirds of the ballots cast by the members of the
retirement association, at an election, called by
the retirement commission, and held, after notice
thereof is posted in each school building and at
the administration office, at least ten days prior
to the day on which said election is held.''
8
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Section 75-29-11 specifies the retirement annuity,
plaintiff coming within the provisions of Class B. therein designated. This Section reads as follows:
~'There

shall be two classes of beneficiaries
under the retirement fund, viz., class A and Class

B.
Class . .A.. On the recommendation of the retirement commission the board of education of
the city shall have po,ver by a two-thirds vote to
retire any member of the association who is mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of duty where such teacher has taught in
the city at least fifteen years, and his or her term
of service aggregates thirty years, except as
hereinafter provided, whether before or after,
or partly before or partly after the passage of
this chapter. Each teacher so retired shall be
entitled to receive as pension an annuity equal
to one-half of the average annual salary .drawn
by such teacher for the five years next preceding
retirement, but in case his or her years of teaching shall not aggregate thirty years, but shall
aggregate at least twenty years, he or she may
be temporarily retired and shall be entitled to
such a part of the annuity as his or her years of
service are a part of thirty. Any teacher who
has been retired under this class and who in the
opinion of a physician selected by the retirement
commission has recovered his mental or physical
powers sufficiently to teach or earn a livelihood
in some other manner, shall cease to draw an
annuity under this classification. If such teacher
does not recover he or she shall be transferred to
Class B whenever he or ·she reaches the age of
sixty, and the years of teaching experience plus
the years of retirement for disability total thirty
years. The years of retirement under the pro-

9
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visions of Class A shall in all cases be counted
as years of teachin~ service in computing qualifications for retirement under Class B.
Class B. Any member of the retire·ment association who has taught thirty years, one-half
of whie:h time has been in the city in which the
retirement association is located, and has reached
the age of sixty years shall, upon his or her request or upon the recommendation of the retirement commission and a two-thirds vote of the
board of education of the city, be placed upon the
retired list, and shall be entitled to an annuity
equal to one-half of the average annual salary
for the five years next preceding retirement;
provided, that the maximum annuity paid to any
teaeher under either Class A or Class B shall not
exceed $600.00. ''
Prior to the Driggs Case, this Court in the case of
Schofield and Tingey vs. Z.C.M.I., 85 Utah, 281; 39 Pac.
2d 342: 96 ALR 1083, even though the pension arrange·
ment contained the language, ''The Board • ~ • reserves
the right • • • to change the basis of pension allowances
by increasing or reducing the same,'' held that after
the nec.essary years had been served, the retirement age
reached, and the pension fixed and allowed, the pensioner's right was vested. Having so held with respect
to such pension system established by private persons
or :corporations, the problem of this Court in the Driggs
case was whether the same law should be applied to a
ease where the grantor of the pension is the State, and
this Court held and is committed to the rule that the
same law must also he applied to the State.
Applying the rule, to which this Court is committed,
to the case now before the Court, we submit that there

10
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is no distiuetion in principle between this and the Driggs
case. Here, as pointed out, Florence Hirst Newcomb
fulfilled all the conditions required to make her annuity
payable, retired and thus had a vested and fixed right
thereto. The source of the contributions here are deductions from the Teacher's salary and contributions by
the Ogden City Board of Education, a taxing unit whose
funds are derived from taxation.
In the Driggs case the result of the legislative act,
if it had been upheld, \Yould have been to cut down the
amount received by Driggs as his annuity. IIere the
effect of Chapter 91, La\vs of Utah, 1949, would not only
result in reducing plaintiff's annuity, but could wipe it
out entirely. The Act reads as follows: ·
''AN ~~CT RELATING TO PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS' RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION;
PROVIDING FOR THE TERMINATION 0].,
A PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS' RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION BY ELECTION OF
THE ~IE~IBERS; AND PROVIDING FOR THE
MANNER IN WHICH SUCH FUNDS SHALL
BE DISTRIBUTED.
Be it enacted by the- I~eg1.slature of the State of
Utah:
SECTION 1. Upon the written request of at
least ten per cent of the members of a public
school teachers' retirement association the retirement commission shall or upon its own motion
the retirement commission may cause an election
to be held by the members of the association for
the purpose of determining whether or· not the
association and its retirement system be terminated. The retirement commission shall cause
each member of the association to be notified in

11
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writing by mailing to his last known address at
least ten days prior to the election of the time,
place and purpose of such election.
If a majority of the ballots cast by the members at such election favor termination of the association, such association shall be terminated
upon the effective date prescribed by the members in such election.
Immediately after such termination of the
association, the retirement commission shall distribute all of the remaining funds and assets of
the association to its members andjor annuitants
andjor claimants in such manner and order as
to the commission shall seem proper or shall
petition the district court of the County within
which the association is located for an order dissolving the association and distributing its funds
and assets to such members andjor annuitants
andjor claimants.''
It is admitted that the funds of the Ogden Public
School Teachers' Retirement Association now amounts
to approximately $71,000.00. If the Association terminated and distributed its funds, even though the entire
sum were distributed solely to the retirement annuitants, there being thirty-two ( 32) of the retired annuitants eaeh entitled to an annuity of $600.00 ·per year, it
is a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate that the
distribution would only pay the annuties for a period of
less than four years.
Hence, if Chapter 91 were held valid as to plaintiff and those similarly situated, their annuities would
not only be reduced but in a comparatively short time
their annuities for which they worked and which they
relied upon receiving for the remainder of their live·s

12
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would b€l eut out. entirely. If retired teachers were thus
left to the grim possibility that future legislatures, after
their retirement, could impair and destroy their annuities there 'vould not~have been the inducement for them
to remain in the teaching profession and the very purpose of the retirement act would be fustrated .
...-\.ny argument as to power which might be claimed

by defendants to modify or reduce the annuities of plaintiff and those similarly situated, is completely answered
by the Z.C.nl.I. and Driggs cases. As was pointed out
in the Z.C.M.I. case, there was a provision in the plan
that the Company Board of Directors could increase or
reduce the amount of the pension. This Court held that
upon retirement, the plaintiffs' ceased to be members
of the system and, therefore, were not affected by such
provision which could only apply to members. In the
case at bar plaintiff ceased to be a member of the Retirement Association upon her retirement and no provision either in statute or rule o:r regulation purporting to give power to modify or reduce her vested annuity
could have any application to her and those similarly
situated.
Again we call the Court's attention to the fact tha.t
plaintiff, upon retirement, ceased to be a member of
the Retirement Association. Chapter 91, Laws of Utah,
1949, provides for an election to be called upon written
request of at least 10% of the members, or the Commission on its own motion may call an election of the
members for the purpose of determining whether the
retirement system be terminated. The Commission is
required to give notice only to members. Ballots are
provided to be cast only by members. Hence this Act,
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by its ve,ry terms, can have no application to plaintiff

and those similarly situated, nor can it affect their
rights, they no longer being members at the time of the
effective date of the Act. Surely~lection from which
the plaintiff and those similarly situated are excluded
cannot affect their vested rights.
The act is not retroactive.
In a later case, following the Driggs case, being the
case of McCarrey vs. Utah State Teachers' Retirement
Board 177 Pae. 2nd. 725, the purpos~ of the State Teachers' Retirement Act was again stated by this Court,
through Justice Wolfe, as follows:
''The purpose of the Teachers' Retirement
Act is to attract and to retain in public school
systems qualified and experienced persons as
teachers.''
Then this Court in the latest case, Gubler vs. Utah
State Teachers Retirement Board 192 Pac. 2nd 580,
again reaffirmed this principle. Justiee Latimer, writing the opinion, quotes with approval the following from
Mahon vs. Board of Education of the City of New York,
68 App. Div. 154; 74 N.Y.S. 172, 174. (At pages 583, 4
of the Paeific ·2nd Reporter) :
'These annuities, after the expiration of the
period of active serviee, are not gratuities, but are
in the nature of compensation for the services
previously rendered, for which full and adequate
compensation was not received at the time of the
rendition of the services; in other words, it is,
in effect, pay withhe.ld to induce long, continued
and faithful serviee. Such statutes are designed
to benefit the public service in tw~ ways : First,
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by encouraging competPut aud faithful employees
\Yho remain in the service, and refrain from embarking in other vocation~ ; and, second, by, retiring- from the public service those who, by devoting their best energies. for a long period of
years to the performance of duties in a public
office or employment and by reason thereof, or
of adYanced age, become incapacitated from performing the duties as well as they might be performed by others more youthful, or in greater
physical or mental vigor. Provision is thus made
for the partial support of such teachers when
their retirement without. such provision was
deemed inequitable, and, but for such_ provision,
doubtless would not be enforced.'

The local retirement act has the same purpose as
the State Act with respect to inducing experienced teachers to join and remain with the school systems in_cities
of the first and second class and, therefore, retirement
benefits of plaintiff and those similarly situated are
in effect payment for services performed and no statute
pa~sed subsequent to retirement can reduce or destroy
the full payment which such retired teachers have a
vested right to receive.
Justice Wolfe, in his concurrence in the decision
of the Driggs case, at Page 435, of the Utah Re·port,
very succinctly stated the principle involved which is
as applicable to this case a.s it was to the Driggs case,
as follows:
•' I think it sufficient to rest my concurrence
on the ground that Driggs, having fulfilled all
the conditions required to make the pension payable had a vested and fixed right thereto. When
'
. to his. employee prospectthe employer
promises
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ive periodic payments to commence after a certain tern1 of 8ervice and upon the fulfillment of
other conditions, it constitutes an offer \vhich
ripens into a contract upon the fulfillment of
those conditions; the fulfillment of the eonditions
which bTings the contract into being at the same
time constitutes a performance of said contract
on the part of the employee. This is true in principle whether it is the State or a private party
which makes the promise or holds out the inducement.''
Although we affirm that the settled law of this
State, applicable to this case, is established by the u tab
decisivns, particularly the Driggs case, \Ve feel that it
might be helpful to the Court to further reft~r to and
quote from the Z.C.M.I. opinion and to cite and discusH
some decisions from other jurisdictions.
Z.C.M.I. in 1911 established a pension system ''for
the purpose of promoting the welfare of the officers and
employees of this institution, and to encourage long and
faithful service.'' All officers and employees who had
attained the age of 65 years and had served the company
honorably for 20 years were entitled to retire with pension. The Board of Directors were to have power to
increase or reduce the pensions at diseretion. The plaintiffs ~aving reached the specified age and served the
required time were comp·elled to retire and the amount
of their monthly pension allowances were fixed _by the
Board. The contributions to the system were required
from employees. The pensions were paid until 1932,
the time of the depression, when the Board of Directors
by resolution sought to reduce the amounts and the plaintiffs brought the action to enforee payment of the orig-
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rrhis ('~ourt held for plaintiffs. In the
Z.C--..~1.1. case, ~Ir. Justire Larson in writing the unanimous opinion, so clearly states the cogent reasons for
the decision that ,v·e here quote at some length from the
opinion. .A.t pages :287-288 of the r:tah report it is said:

inal

allo"~anres.

··In the pension system here involved, the
company said to its employees: Any one who shall
ser,~e me faithfully for 20 years and attain the
age of 65 years shall be entitled to retire with
pension based upon his past salary, 'vhich· offer
and promise is made to induce you to continue
in my employ, to render faithful service to me
without seeking other employment or worrying
about provisions for your welfare when time takes
its toll on your strength and opportunity. It is
offered to 'promote the welfare of t~e employee'
(to relieve him from worry and provide for his
old age), and 'to encourage long and faithful
service' (for the benefit of the company); the
employee who has met the requirements 'shall
be entitled to retire with pension,' not may be retired with pension, but shall have the right to
retire with pension. It further provides that 'the
amount of pension to which an e·mployee is entitled at 65' (not that he may draw, but that be
shall have a right to draw) shall be computed according to his past salary and years of service.
(Parenthetical expressions ours.)
''Plaintiffs after this offer by the defendant, _.
continued in its employment, served faithfully for
20 years, and attained the age of 65 years. The
board of pensions then 'determined their eligibility to receive pension allowance '-that is, determined that they bad met the requirements of
the offer and had earned their pensions; it fixed
the amount of pension and made the allowance
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of the same and retired the plaintiffs from further service. Clearly, such facts, circumstances,
and history do not evidence an offer of a gratuity, ,.
but an offer to pay certain sums when plaintiffs
shall have eompletely performed a certain set of
acts, offered as an inducement to them to perform the acts, and given as a consideration for
their eomplete performance. vVhen the plaintiffs
had completely performed their· obligations and
. the board of pensions had determined their right
to pension, made allowanee thereof, and retired
them, the contract was complete and binding, and
not subject to modification by the company without consent of plaintiffs.

'' * * * Where services are performed undP-r
a statute providing for pensions, the pension becomes part of the contemplated compensation for
services, and in a sense becomes part of the contract of employment. 43 C.J. 813, Langer v.
Superior Steel Corp., 105 Pa. Super. 579, 161 A.
571; MeLemore v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Or.
228, 171 P. 390, 1049."
And at Pages 292-293 of the Utah report, Justice Larson
says:
''Under the provisions of section 16 'the
Board of Directors reserves the right to change
or amend any of the foregoing rules and regulations at any time and to change the basis of pension allowa.nees by increasing or reducing the
same.' What rules and regulations may the hoard
change? Why, clearly, the rules and regulations
governing the conditions under which an employee may earn a pension; the rules governing
the ohjects of the pension system 'to encourage·
long and faithful service and promote the welfare of its employees.' The rules affecting the
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in~titution

in its relationship to its employees as
announced in the preamble may be changed. The
institution has no rules and regulations governing its ex-employees or retired employees, and
so could not change them.
'~The

board reser,~es the right to 'change
the basis of pension allowances by increasing
or redur.ing the same. ' The basis of pension
allo"\\·ances is the basis fixed for computing the
pension 'Yhen the same shall have been earned;
"-hen the employee has met the requirements of
the rules and regulations and is retired. What,
then, has he earned as a pension~ The amount
thereof is determined by the basis fixed in the
rule, and, applying the formula or rule then in
force to the facts in this case as to salary and
time of service, the amount of his pension is determined and allowed by the board of pensions,
certified to the company and the employee then
retired upon such allowance. Until the pension
has been earned, until the employee shall have
been found entitled to retire and to a pension,
the Board of Directors reserves the right to
change the basis of allowance, that is, the basis
for computing the pension upon which the employee is to be retired.
''The pension allowance is the amount allowed by the pension board, the amount fixed by
them as earned and due the employee upon his
retirement. It signifies the determining of the
amount earned as a pension, the approval of the
amount by the pension board, and setting it up as
a fixed charge that has been allowed against
the institution. When it has been determined,
fixed, and set up, when it has been allowed by
the pension board and the employee retj red,
there is no longer any reason in saying the board
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can change the rule for computing and allowing
·that which has already been computed, allowed,
and a'varded as earned by and due the employee
as a pension for his long and faithful service
to the company. It seem's clear that Section 15
and 16 ha:ve no application to a retired pensioner
whose pension has been fixed and determined.''
The case of 0 'Dea v. Cook, et al., 169 Pacific 366 is
the leading case in California on the subject of pensions
and when they hec.ome vested contract rights in the
pensioner. It has been followed many times in California decisions and its holding is the law in that State.
In the 0 'Dea case, one Edward 0 'De a was a member of
the Police Department of San Francisco. While in the
performance of his duties, he received injuries which
later resulted in his death. At the time of these injuries
there was a pension ordinanee in foree providing a pension for the families of policemen killed in the performanee of duty. Between the time· of 0 'Dea 's injuries and
his death therefrom, the San Franeisco ordinance was
amended to require that death ensue within one year
of injury to entitle the family to the pension. 0 'Dea did
not die within the year. . When his widow sought her
pension, she was met with the contention that the amend··
ment had deprived her of it so she brought an action in
mandate. The Court held for the widow. We quote
from Page 367 of the opinion as follows:
''The refusal of the hoard to recognize the
widow's claim was based upon its view that at
the time of O'Dea's death, when the widow for
the first time became entitled to a pension on
account of death, the c.ontrolling law under which
it could he granted was that found in the amendment of 1913, and as 0 'Dea admittedly had not
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died "·ithin one year from tht.\ date of his injury
the "·idow's claim "'"as not allowable. Upon this
appeal this is the proposition argued, and in the
argument it is pointed out that the amendment
was made to relieve from the uncertainty as to
the length of time 'Yhich must elapse between
injury and death, \\·hich uncertainty was noted
in Ed,vards Y. Sweigert, 15 Cal. App. 503, 115
Pac. 256. Further, appellant insists that the respondent had acquired no vested rights to a pension which the amendment could not take away,
and that whatever rights she did possess were,
in fact, taken a"""ay by the amendment and by
virtue of the fact that her husband did not die
within one year after sustaining his injuries.
•'A pension such as this law contemplates
is not a gratuity or a gift. If it were, all of the
provisions pertaining to it would be void, under
the Constitution of the State, Art. 4, Par. 31;
Taylor v. Mott, 123 Cal. 497, 56 Pac. 256. .A
pension is a gratuity only where it is granted for
services previously rendered, and which at the
time they were rendered gave rise to no legal obligation. United States v. Teller, 107 U. S. 64,
2 Sup. Ct. 39, 27 L Ed. 352; Mahon v. Board of
Education, 171 N. Y. 263, 63 N. E. 1107, 89 Am.
St. Rep. 810; State, etc., v. Love, 89 Neb. 149,
131 N. W. 196, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 607, Ann. Cas,1912 C. 542. But where, as here, services are
rendered under such a pension statute, the pension provisions becomes a part of the contemplated compensation for those services, and so in
a sense a part of the contract of employment itself. Hammitt v. Gaynor (Sup) 144 N.Y. Supp.
123; State, etc. v. Love, supra; People, etc. Y.
Abbott, 274 Ill. 380, 113 N. E. 696 * * *

"It is a firmly established principle of ju-dicial construction that pension statutes serving

21
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a beneficial purpose are to be liberally construed.
Walton v. Cotton, 9 How.· (60 U. S.) 355, 15 IJ.
Ed. 658; Hanescom v. lVIalden, etc. Gas Light Co.,
220 Mass. 1, 107 N. E. 426. Ann. Cas. 1917 A 145.
''A fundamental and universal rule in the construction of statutes is that they shall be given
prospective effect and not retrospective effect,
unless such latter effect is made c.ompulsory by
the language of the act itself. Vanderbilt v.
all Persons, 163 Cal. 507, 126 Pac. 158.'5'
The O'Dea case was followed by the California Court
of Appeal in the case of Klench v. Board of Pension
Fund Commissioners 249 Pacific 46. Th~re the police
pension system of the City of Stockton ·was involved and
the Court held that the retired pensioner had a ve·sted
right to his pension which could not subsequently be cut
down. We quote the following from page 49-50 of the
opinion:
'' lVloreover, while no public officer of employee of the government is entitled as of right to
a pension (Douglas v. Pension Boa.rd of the City
of Sacramento et al. (Cal. App~) 242 Pae. 756),
still, when once the government establishes a
retire:rne:nt pension system for it~ officers and
employees and provides· the funds a.nd means
for administering it according to its design, any
such offieer or employee, when the conditions
arise or occur upon which, under the rules and
regulations of the system, he becomes eligible to
be retired and plaeed upon the pension roll, and
he having met all the ·requirements entitling him
to be so retired has in fact been retired and enrolled upon the pension list, has then a.cquired a
vested right to draw his pension and to receive
as such whatever sum or sums of monev mav be
provided for such purpose for officer~ or ·em-
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ployees of the e}ass to \Vhic.h he belongs. rrhe
petitioner here ..as the admitted averments of the
petition disclose, had become elig·ible, under the
terms of the Pension Act of 1889, to be retired.
__._o\ll the eonditions upon 'vhich his retirement on
a pension could be effected had occurred, and he
"·as accordingly legitimately retired and placed
upon the pension roll. His right to he paid the
money proYided for police officers of his class or
rank had become vested and hence it does not lie
within the power of the city council by ordinance,
or by inaction '\Yith respect to the enforcement
of such ordinance, in effect to destroy that right,
until the conditions upon which he was retired
and placed upon the pension roll have ceased to
exist. Kavanagh v. Board of Police Com'rs, 134
Cal. 50, 52, 66 Pac.. 36; Cohrn v. Henderson, 19
Cal. App. 90, 91, 124 P. 1037; Sheehan v. Board of
Police Com'rs, 47 Cal. App. 29, 34, 190 P. 51;
0 'Dea v. Cook et al., 176 Cal. 659, 661 et seq., 169
P. 366.
''The cases of Pennie v. Reis, 80 Cal. 266,
22 P. 176, and Clarke v. Reis, 87 Cal. 543, 25 P.
759, involved situations entirely different from
that presented here. In the Pennie case the
statute authorizing insurance benefits for. the
widow or family of police officers were repealed
before the death of the officer whose legal successor was attempting enforcement of the claim
set up under the repealed statute. In the Clarke
case the officer was dismissed from the department before the happening of the contingency
upon which, had it happened prior to his dismissal, he would have been entitled to a pension.
In the Pennie case it was held, as also it was
held by the Supreme Court of the UnitLd States
to which that case was taken (Pennie v. Reis,
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132 U. S. 464, 10 S. Ct. 149, 33 Ij. Ed. ·426), that
the police officer concerned therein acquired no
vested right in the moneys provided for the payment of police pensions or life insurance and
that no such right conld ·be acquired 'until the
event happens upon which the money was to be
paid.' It was also so held in the Clarke case.
These cases, however, at least inferentially support the view that, 'vhen the event or the contingency happens upon which the officer is entitled to receive the money provided for pensioning him as a retired officer, then, in that case,
the right to he paid such money is a vested right.''
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the
case of Dismuke v. United States 297 U. S. 167, 80 L.
Ed. 561, involving the United States Civil Service Retirement Act, at page 565 of the L. Ed. report, says:
''The proviso withholding jurisdiction of
suits on claims for pensions was a. part of the
original Tucker Act, which became law March 3,
1887, long before the enactment of the Retirement Act of May 22, 1920, and at a time when
the term 'pensions' commonly referred to the
gratuities paid by the government in recognition
of past services in the Army and Navy. The
annuities payable under the Retirement Act are
not gratuities in that sense. The annuitant contributes to them by deductions from his salary or
by actual payments into the fund, as in the present ease, and the scheme of 'the Act is to provide
for payment of annuities, in part at least from
contributions by employee·s, in recognition both
of their pa.st services and of services to he performed."
The case of Talbott v. Indep~ndent School District.
230 Iowa 949, 299, N. W. 556, 137, A.L. R. 234; discusses
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rights under a tParhers' retirement net. ThPre it iH held
that the allo,Yauce is not a merL~ g-ratuity a11d awarded
the teacher the amount "~hich vested at the date of her
retirement. In an annotation to this case in 137 A.L.R.
249-63 the annotator, at page ~49, ~ays:
··The traditional rule that a pension g·ranted
by public authority is not a contractual obligation, but a gratuitous allowance, iu the continuance of " ..hich the pensioner has no vested right,
but that it ma~~ be terminated at "~in by the au·
thority bestowing it, is still adhered to, but the
number of cases ''hich ~ts application has been
deemed proper has diminished, in comparison
with those upholding· as vested, at least in a limited sense, rights of beneficiaries under various
retirement pay and other plans similar in nature
to adjusted compensation and insurance features.
The growing number of such cases is, of course,
due to the adoption and extension of such systems
to greater numbers and groups of ·employees in
all branches of public and semi-public service.
It may be observed that the right of a particular
employee in a pension must be isolated a!!d determined by scrutiny of the details and provisions
o~ the statute under which he claims.''
And at page 255 of the annotation, he say~:
''And many cases have considered that where
official allowance of a pension has been made,
· under a detailed plan complete in its seope arid
containing no express reservation or one implied
in law from the nature of the statute or other
situation inherent in it, the pensioner has a right
to continued payment undiminished in amount.''
The Courts of Pennsylvania su~tain the proposition argued for by the plaintiff in the case at bar. In
the case of McBride .v. Retirement Board et al. 330 Pa.
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402, 199 Atlantic 130, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
held that a retired county employee had a vested right
in his retirement allo,vance which the legislature could··
not impair. rrhe Court said (page 132 of the Atlantic
report):
"So strong is this vested right that it has
been held that the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution forbids impairment by the states
not only by statute, but also by amendment to,
or change of the state Constitution."
The Court further stated (page 133 of the Atlantic report):
''Retirement pay is part of the compensation
for services rendered during active employment.
Plaintiff's rights under the retirement act, having
vested upon his becoming eligible for retirement,
could not be impaired by legislation.''
An analogous situation is presented by the Government war risk insurance cases. The Supreme Court
of the United States in the case of Lynch v. United
States 29·2 U. S. 571, 54 S. Ct. 480, 78 L. Ed. 1434, held
that the beneficiary of war risk insurance who had paid
his premiums had a vested contract right and the
United States could not impair it by subsequent legislation.
Crawford v. Teachers' Retirement Fund Association 99 Pacific ( 2d) 729 is a ca.se decided by the Supreme Court of Oregon in 1940. The Court held that a
teaeher who· retired under compulsory retirement provision after contributing to and complying with all the
requirements of the system, had a vested right in her retirement annuity which could not be impaired by subse-
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quent changes in the by-la\\·s of the A~~tH!iation, holding that the statute establishing the retirement system
became a part of her contract. The Court said:
· ~ '';"e think the trend of modern authority
and the better-reasoned cases are to the effect
that contractual relations are created and that,
upon full performance by the annuitant, rights
accrue "~hich cannot be impaired by subsequent
legislation. · '
The Supreme Court of Washington in the case of
In re Sanborn, 292 Pacific 259, decided in 1930, is one
in which the interpretation of the Washing-ton Teachers' Retirement System was involved. The Court,
at page 261, said:
""We grant the contention of repondent that
the relation of the applicant is contractual and
that bY" acceptance of the terms of the statute
the teacher created a contract, the terms of which
could not be impaired by the legislature.''

POINT 2
CHAPTER 91, LAWS OF UTAH, 1949, SO FAR AS
IT AFFECTS PLAINTIFF AND THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED, IS AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION
OF POWER TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE BODY AND
IS IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE V, SECTION I OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Chapter 91, Laws of Utah, 1949, is heretofore set
forth in full. Manifestly under this Act, the defendants, as an administrative body, could distribute the
funds and assets of the Association to the association
members, andjor claimants, in such manner and order·
as the defendants in their uncontrolled and unregulated
discretion might determine, without any standards or
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order fixed in the Act to control the exercise of the defendant commission's diseretion; or the defendants,
as such administrative body, could in its uncontrolled
and unregulated discretion petition the District Court
for an order dissolving the Association and distributing its funds and assets to the members, and/or
annu,
ants, andjor claimants. Under this Act, there being
no control upon their discretion or standard set, the
defendants could distribute all of the assets of the Association to the present members of the Association
totally excluding the annuitants. We submit that such
delegation of uncontrolled power is in violation of the
settled general rule with regard to delegation of power
to an administrative body. This rule is well stated
in the case of Rowell, et al., vs. State Board of Agriculture, et al., 98. U tab 353, 99 Pac. 2d, 1.
This Court, at page 358 and 359 of the Utah Report, quotes with approval the rule as laid down in
Thompson vs. ·Smith, 155 Va. 367,. 154 S. E~. 579, 584,
71 A. L. R. 604 as follows:
"It is a fundamental principle of our system
of government that the rights of men a.re to be
dete-rmined by law itself and not by the let or
leave of administative officers or bureaus. This
principle ought not to be surrendered for convenience or in effect nullified and function of
the legislative branch of the government whether
state or municipal, to determine and declare what
the law shall be, and the legislative branch of the
government ma.y not divest itself of this function
or delegate it to executive or ·administrative
off.1cers .... ''
''The majority of the cases lay down the
rule that the statutes or ordinances vesting dis28
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cretiou in administiYt.~ officPrs aud bureaus must
lay do"~n rules and tl~sts to guide and control
them iu the exercise of thP discretion granted
in order to be Yalid * • * . ''
In the case of State ex rei Donaldson vs.
182 Pac. 2d. 865 (Kans.) it is held

Hind;~

. A. delegation of po\Yer to an administrative
agency must fix a reasonably clear standard
which goYerns the exercise of the power. A
delegation of po"\\rer by the Legislature to an
agency cannot be supported in total absence of
a primary standard or a broad outline, nor can a
standard be set " . .hich is so indefinite as to confer an unlimited po\\Ter.

The entire lack of any stand~rds to govern the discretion of the defendant commission is so fatal to the
validity of this Act as to preclude it from being held
valid in part under a~y exception to the general rule
with regard to unlawful delegation of power. The
case of State ex rei Donaldson vs. Hinds, supra, is. clearly
in point. We quote the following from the opinion
in that case, Page 876:
''The general doctrine is that only the invalid parts of a statute are without legal efficacy.
This is qualified by the further rule that if the
void and valid parts of the statute are so connected with each other in the general scheme ·of
the Act that they cannot be separated without
violence to the evident intent of the Legislature,
the whole must fail.''
Thus it cannot be said that the portion of the Act
which provides for termination of the Association i~
valid, even though there are no standards set for the
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control of discretion in distribution of funds and assets~
because termination of the Association and distribution
of its funds and assets are so indissolubly connected·
that they cannot he separated without violence to the
intent of the Act and, therefore, the lack of standards
governing dis-cretion causes the whole Act to fail.
The defendants in their answer have alleged that
the Board of Education of Ogden City is a necessary
party as a defendant in this action. The defendants filed
a motion to amend the alternative writ by deleting
from the order that portion thereof requiring· the defendants herein to continue the monthly payments to
the annuitants~ This motion was argued on the 18th
day of July, 1949, and during the eourse of the argument, defendants' counsel argued that the Board of
Education of Ogden City was a necessary party defendant in order to properly adjudicate the matters before
the Court. While the plaintiff claims th~t ~e ~chool
Board is not a necessary party to this ~ the
Court shall determine that the School Board is a necessary or proper party to be joined in this action, th
~be made a party de en ant to this action by order
laintiff moves that the Board of Education of Ogdeii>
of this Court and such reasonable time be given said
Board in which to file such pleadings as it may desire
so that it may have opportunity to be heard in its own
behalf.
We respectfully submit that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for and that the alternative
writ should be made permanent.
Respectfully submitted,
Samuel C. Powell,
Derrah B. Van Dyke,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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